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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JUDGES GARFF, JACKSON, and ORME
The Plaintiff/Appellant, City of St. George, by and through
counsel, T. W. Shumway, submits the following reply in answer to
new matters set forth by Appellee in its brief filed on January 27,
1992.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The most definitive test of obscenity, and the one followed by
the courts since 1973, forms the basis for the St. George City
ordinance under which Turner was convicted.

That test safeguards

against derogation of the constitutional right to free expression
by setting minimum standards. The duty of an appellate court is to
assure that these standards have been met or exceeded before a jury
makes determination of the obscenity of any particular material.
In this case, the evidence in "cne trial court: was sufficient to
reach required limits, and by holding that it was not, the Court of
Appeals has substituted its qualitative idea of obscenity for the
judicially approved minimum definition of that troublesome concept.
By doing so, it denies appropriate application of a community
standard.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
INDEPENDENT REVIEW BY AN APPELLATE COURT IS A LIMITED REVIEW
It is clear that an appellate court has a duty to review the
jury verdict in this case to assure the Turner depictions fall
within

the

substantive

limitations

suggested

in

Miller

v.

California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). The
City has never denied that.

At issue between the parties is the

extent of that review. Such appellate review is for the purpose of
rejecting a jury verdict if it does not meet uhe minimum "threshold
2

of obscenity elements necessary to prevent an erosion of protected
First Amendment rights. Review is not for the purpose of making a
new and total determination of obscenity, with entire disregard of
the jury findings and substitution of its own findings.

Turner1s

characterization of the appellate role as "de novo11 implies a full
factual finding as to obscenity by an appellate court not having
full access to either the questionable material or its displayer.
1.

Fixing a Threshold is Not Equivalent to Determining

Obscenity.
2150,

What does Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct.

41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), relied upon heavily by Turner, inzend

for the appellate court to "independently review"? "Constitutional
claims when necessary."

Turner has made a constitutional claim

that the City violated his right of free speech.

While appellate

courts are generally limited to a consideration of fact questions,
in

an

obscenity

case

certain

fact

issues

"constitutional facts" akin to a law question.

are

framed

as

Infringement upon

First: Amendment rights is an error of law that should be corrected
by an appellate court.

However, this does not open the door to

determination by the appellate court of all the facts. A role is
necessarily preserved for the jury.
2.
province.

Jurv Role.
A

Determination of obscenity is the jury's

constitutional

threshold, such

as

the minimum

requirement for "patent offensiveness", may be met without a jury
necessarily finding material to be obscene. The appellate court's
province is to reject the jury's verdict only if it: fails to meet:
or exceed a minimum standard.

Should a jury verdict be overridden

or disregarded every time request is made for appellate review?
Obviously

not;

a

de

novo

review

of

the

entire

factual

determination of obscenity would obviate the role of a jury.

The

appellate court should make a quantified review of the evidence to
determine that substantive thresholds are met and proper standards
applied by the jury, not to make a de novo determination of all
fact issues.

If an appellate court were to undertake the latter,

there would be no way of properly applying community standards, for
instance.
3,

Applicable Law. Appellate assurance that thresholds are

met without supplanting the jury's role is the balance required by
the cases.

Bose v. Consumer Unions of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485

(1984), cited by Turner, defines the Court's role as "marking out
the limits of a standard11.

It permits appellate consideration to

be made on a case-by-case basis, recognizing that there are
categories "to which the majestic protection of the First Amendment
does not extend because they

'are no essential part of any

exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality1 Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 62 S.Ct. 766
(1942)."

Bose 466 U.S. at 504.

"independently

The appellate role is to

decide whether the evidence

in the record is

sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold" that would
otherwise bar the entry of judgment.

Bose, 511.

The facts must

necessarily be analyzed and reviewed, but need the appellate court
4

do so beyond what is necessary to verify that those facts have been
safely shepherded across that line between speech unconditionally
guaranteed and speech which may be legitimately regulated?

No.

Rather, the courts define the area in which the local community may
chart its own course in dealing with obscene materials, and the
appellate court need only verify that the trier of fact has stayed
within that area. Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 431 U.S. 49, 5354, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, decided in 1973 at the same time
as Miller v. California, supra.

Otherwise, a trial de novo would

be an automatic consequence of any and every appeal, and the
statement of Brennan in his dissent in Paris Adult Theater, supra,
repeated in his dissent to Jenkins v. Georgia, supra, would be a
correct observation:
"And the careful efforts of state and lower federal
courts to apply the standard will remain an essentially
pointless exercise, in view of the need for an ultimate
decision by this Court."
Under the law, determination of a threshold is not equal to finding
the ultimate fact of obscenity. The Court of Appeals here has gone
beyond the mere duty of independent review, thereby diminishing the
intended function of the jury.

POINT II
TURNER MATERIALS MEET THE CONSTITUTIONAL THRESHOLD
While the materials in each case must be examined by an
appellate court, it need not revisit every detail of the trial but
rather can teasure then by the yardstick cf types and classes.
Both Jenkins v, Georgia, supra, cited by Turner, and Miller v.
5

California, supra, cited by the City, give examples of such types
or classes of materials that may be properly considered obscene.
Both listings include "lewd exhibition of the genitals. "

The

materials in the case at hand are of that type or class; the bare
midriff of Jenkins was not within that or any other. The examples
listed by the cases are intended to help define the threshold
within relatively general parameters.

Fine-tuning beyond that

point and actual determination of obscenity is a function of the
community standard as applied by the local jury.

The Court of

nppeaxs Dozn in une majority opinion anc in z.ne cissenz scucjnz tc
characterize the degree of explicity of the drawings, and yet the
wall hangings in their full size, context and degree of detail were
viewed only by the trial judge and jury.

The blown-up display of

any vagina in a public store without an ameliorating context is
sufficiently lewd to fall within a described class and exceed the
threshold; determination by an appellate court that one genital is
presented in such detail that it is too salacious for public
display while another vagina is not and, ergo, may be displayed
disregards the threshold classification afforded by case law.
Most of the specific cases cited by Turner dealing with
defined materials are prior to Miller, supra, and from a lower
court, but none of them hold categorically that exposed genitalia
with nothing more cannot be obscene.

To do so would contradict

specific statements of the U. S. Supreme Court.

The Court of

Appeals concluded that the drawings are "not public portrayals of
hard core sexual conduct for its own sake".
6

It is not explained

what purpose there was in creating or displaying the material if
not to convey a sexual message, albeit more disgusting and base
than erotic•

Further, while crude, the purpose of display in this

context would not have been altered if drawings in similar scale
and detail were carefully done by a master painter or even if they
were photographs.

POINT III
EEXPOSURE TO MINORS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS AN APPROPRIATE ELEMENT OF
JURY CONSIDERATION
Contrary to what is argued by Turner, evidence was presented
and allowed in the trial court regarding patronage of Turner1 s shop
by

students

and

other minors

(Trial Transcript, p.236, for

example) , and the likelihood of minors patronizing the shop was
discussed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.

The City has

never taken the position that exposure to juveniles would cause a
standard other than Miller to be applied; it only urges that this
fact may soften the rigidity with which the Miller standards are
applied.

Miller itself recognizes increased danger when the mode

of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of exposure
to juveniles. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 19. It challenges
Brennan's suggestion in the dissent that a different test be
applied in the case of juveniles (Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at
27) and recommends that the test it formulates be applied to
obscenity

in every circumstance.

application

of

the

Miller

That does not prevent the

standards

with

some

heightened

sensitivity where minors are involved.

This Court in State v.

Haig, 578 P.2d 8 37 (1978) recognizes that the community may take
note of a context which involves exposure to juveniles in applying
the Miller test (concurring opinion at 843).

POINT IV
THE BED SHEET DECOR IS NOT UNITED BY A THEME
Does the work, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient
interest?

So reads the Miller language in setting forth the

second, or prurient interest, prong of the test.

Where composite

material is involved (the bed sheets) as opposed to material that
is fairly unified in content (a single movie), however, the scope
of the prurient interest standard does not require a court to try
and embrace the entirety of items displayed together but which bear
little or no relation to each other in order to create a "whole".
The notion that an isolated excerpt could be extracted from a book
and found to be obscene, as in Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.D. 360
(1868), was rejected by a series of cases involving novels, such as
United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses,", 5 Fed.Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2nd Circuit 1934).

What is

clear fron the evolution of these cases is that the "taken as a
whole" concept was intended to apply to thematic materials - such
as novels.

Miller, for example, refers to "the work".

Materials

that comprise a single work, or which are united in some way by a
theme, must be taken as a whole. On the other hand, material that
is made up of various thematic units, or unrelated features, is not
S

intended by the courts to be taken as a whole just because it has
been assembled into the same presentation.
The drawings and descriptions on the Turner bad sheets have no
more theme or interrelationship than do the totality of paintings
hanging in the Louvre. Several photographs that might otherwise be
obscene, when used to illustrate a non-obscene article to which
they

are

thematically

related,

are constitutionally

because of the unit concept of the entire article.

redeemed

That does not

mean that an article obscene in its entirety, photographs and text,
would be constitutionally redeemed because ix: is placed inzo a
magazine containing other, unrelated articles that are not obscene.
The Court in Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, did not consider the
entire newspapers it reviewed as wholes, but rather confined its
application of the "taken as a whole" test to two individual
articles or sections within those newspapers.

The discussion by

the dissent in the Court of Appeals decision, 813 P.2d at 1200,
correctly elaborates on the "unit of perception" as constituting
the "work" to which the prurient interest prong of Miller must be
applied.
Turner primarily argues the "taken as a whole" concept as a
part of the third prong of the Miller test (serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value), citing City of Urbana v.
Downing, 539 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1989), which deals with that third
prong.

However, it might be noted that the Court of Appeals

applies "taken as a whole" in support of its refusal to find an
appeal to the prurient interest, the second prong.
9

POINT V
TURNER HAS NOT CROSS-APPEALED, AND THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER
POINTS NOT ASSIGNED AS ERROR BY THE CITY
Two arguments are presented by Turner for consideration in
this Court which are the subject of decision by the Court of
Appeals and not appealed from.

A party not filing a cross appeal

should not be allowed to seek to sustain reversal of a lower court
verdict and judgment on points where the intermediate court did not
reverse the lower court.

As the action of the Court of Appeals

varied in each case, tne two arguments will joe treated separately.
A.

Constitutionality of Ordinance.

The Court of Appeals

found the ordinance to be constitutional (decision, 813 P.2d at
1191) ; Turner would have this Court find it unconstitutional and,
in effect, overrule the intermediate court by reversing the trial
court decision in that regard.

Turner correctly states that an

appellate court should affirm the judgment of the lower court where
possible, even if it must do so on grounds different from those
relied upon by the lower court.

However, that rule-does not have

proper application to the case at hand. Here the Court of Appeals
specifically ruled upon the constitutionality of the ordinance; as
to that issue, the court made a decision, and we are not presented
with a need to support it through some reasoning different from
that used by the Court of Appeals.

Rather a modification of the

decision in that regard can only be made by overruling it. A

10

typical statement of the rule urged by Turner is found in Lewis &
Sons Construction Co. v. General Insurance Company, 30 Utah2d 290,
517 P.2d 539, 540:
"Whether or not the judge gave the correct reason for his
ruling is of no importance, since he should be affirmed
if he reached the correct result."
The case at hand is different because Turner disagrees with the
result itself, not just the reasoning used to arrive at that
result.

If

the

Court

of

Appeals

had

failed

to

mention

unconstitutionality of the ordinance as a basis for its decision,
and it were in face unconstitutional, tnis court might properly
supply that lack of constitutionality as a better basis for the
decision

of

the

intermediate

court.

However,

that

court

specifically dealt with constitutionality, and it clearly decided
the ordinance was constitutional.

This Court cannot alter that

without reversing the intermediate court, and that would require an
appeal by Turner.
B.

Turner Argues that the Citv Failed to Meet its Burden of

Proof, and that the Court of Appeals did not Address that Issue.
The Court of Appeals treats burden of proof as an inherent part of
an issue it did address:

whether the obscenity ordinance was

properly applied to Turner.

(See decision, 813 P2d at 1190)

Whether the City met its burden of proof in the lower court was a
necessary consideration by the Court of Appeals in making its
decision, and the matter cannot be separated
decision.

out from that

The issues examined by the Court of Appeals and the

requirement that the City meet certain thresholds posed by the
II

Miller test amount to an evaluation of the City!s burden of proof
and the extent to which it was met.
The question of whether the City nei its burden, while a legal
question in one sense, involves primarily issues of fact, and
becomes the law of the case so as to preclude re-examination of the
evidence outside of the area assigned as error and from which
appeal is taken, unless it appears that the Court of Appeal's
decision was based upon mistaken facts or will result in manifest
injustice.
110;

Lincoln Nat. Life Ins, Co. v. Roosth, (CA5) 306 F.2d

111. C.G.R. Co. v. International Paper Co. ^1385, Ck5j 385

F.2d 536.

The question of whether the City bore the burden of

proving each element of the crime was presented to the Court of
Appeals, and consideration by it of that burden of proof was
necessary to the decision it rendered. People v. Pacini (1981) 120
Cal.App. 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. 820. As part of the law of the case
emerging from that Court of Appeals, this point should not now be
reviewed except to the extent it was appealed from by the City.
Notwithstanding the position taken by the City in this Point
V, the two improper arguments will be discussed.

POINT VI
THE ST, GEORGE OBSCENITY ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS PACE.
The Court of Appeal's opinion does not dispute, and it should
be evident, that the elements contained in the St. George ordinance
are

sufficient to sustain

attack.

it against ordinary

constitutional

See, for example, Miller v. California, 413 U.S., at 25,
12

tnd Hamlincr v. United States, 418 U.S. at 114, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41
li.Ed.2d 590;
Though

it may

State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837 at 845 (Utah, 1978).
not be

"narrowly

tailored",

the

ordinance is

reasonably related to the legitimate goal of prohibiting exhibition
of obscene material.

The diagnosis by Turner of the infirmity of

over-broadness rests upon the premise that for First Amendment
purposes an ordinance that proscribes anything less than some form
of sexual action is unconstitutional. That premise is demonstrably
erroneous and cannot be consistently applied.

To find overbreadth

in the phrase "lewd exhibition of the genitalsi;, even as expanded
by addition of "including any explicit close-up representation of
a human genital organ or a spread-eagle exposure of female genital
organs," is to forbid the City from drafting legislation based on
Supreme Court precedent.

Miller, supra, does not limit its test

to sexual action when it states "patently offensive representations
or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, (action) and
lewd exhibition of the genitals (non-action) .,! The Miller court
goes on to state that "sex and nudity may not be exploited without
limit by . . . pictures exhibited . . .

in places of public

accommodation", and in that context "nudity", while referring to
nudity that is obscene, does not in any way infer "sexual action".
Following the hallmark effort in Miller to define "obscenity", no
case has held a lewd display of genitals to be outside of that
definition.

13

While

not

properly

constitutionality

of the

at

issue

St. George

before

this

obscenity

Court,

the

ordinance was

correctly decided by the Court of Appeals.

POINT VII
THE CITY MET ITS BURDEN OP PROOF
Turner's argument that the City failed to sustain its burden
of proof essentially maintains that the City failed to pass the
Miller test.

Sufficiency cf the City's presentation to the trial

court in that regard is at the core of tne decision by the Ccart cf
Appeals.

While that decision makes scant reference to the third

prong of the Miller test, it was nonetheless before the court, and
it must be assumed that the Miller test was applied in its entirety
by the Court of Appeals in rendering its decision.
Even if that were not so, the trial court properly decided the
wall hangings were obscene as defined by the City ordinance which
requires that they have no serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value. A prosecutor is no longer required to show that
a work is "utterly without redeeming social value11, as in Memoirs
v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419, 86 S.Ct. 975, 16 L.Ed.2d 1,
but rather a serious value standard is applied, making prosecution
more reasonable. Evidence was presented to show that (1) there was
no attempt to create a serious statement (Trial Transcript, p. 2 3 2;
p. 240) and (2) there was no message of any significant value
communicated

(Trial Transcript, p. 296;

p. 188).

Aside from

Turner himself, who is unable to ascribe any serious intent or
14

valuable effect to the drawings, the defense put on only one
witness who was shown pictures of the material in question•

His

sole comment on the value or significance of the drawings taken as
a whole is at page 283 of the Transcript, lines 21-25:
"Well, taken as a whole, it appears to be a work,
essentially, of graffiti with a number of slogans, which
allude to kinds of issues — I don't know if they're
important issues. Some of them appear to be issuesoriented kinds of things that are common in media today."
The prosection's burden in the trial court was to establish every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt;

the quantum of

evidence the law demands was found by the trial court to be
present.

The Court of Appeals has challenged the lower court

decision on two of the Miller prongs only, and it is to these that
review by this Court should be limited.
Miller affirms the commitment of the courts to guard against
"any

infringement

of

genuinely

serious

literary,

political or scientific expression" (emphasis added).

artistic,
The adverb

"genuinely" calls for a sensible perspective in evaluating whether
Turner seriously intended to make a specific statement of any
value.

The gossamer claim that the material has serious value is

more pretense than reality, and the Appellate Court properly
declined to give any meaningful consideration to that prong of the
Miller test as applied to these materials.

Proper inquiry is

whether a reasonable person would find serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value in the material, taken as a whole,
according to Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501, 107 S.Ct. 1918,
95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987), and there is no requirement that the City
15

produce expert testimony or introduce scholarly treatises in order
to analyze the material.
called only two witnesses:

In Pope v. Illinois, supra, the State
the arresting detective and an officer

to identify photographs of the bookstore.

See People v. Pope, 138

111. App. 3d at 732-33, 486 N.E.2d at 353.

CONCLUSION
At bottom, the Court of Appeal's reversal for failure to
satisfy the first two prongs of Killer appears to misapprehend the
appropriate

scope

of

inquiry

into

the

context-specific

predominantly legal issue of minimum thresholds.

but

The sensitive

balance between constitutional rights and local community interests
must be carefully maintained in making that inquiry.

Important

constitutional rights cannot be left to the personal prejudices or
passions of jurors, nor can the fundamental right of a community to
determine its own values be ignored.

In the event the former may

tend to overshadow the latter, it would be well to remain aware of
the admonition of Justices Berger and Renquist in dissent, Schad v.
Mt. Eohraim, 452 U.S. 61 at 87, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671:
"The fact that a form of expression enjoys some
constitutional protection does not mean that there are
not times and places inappropriate for its exercise. The
towns and villages of this Nation are not, and should not
be, forced into a mold cast by this Court.
Citizens
should be free to choose to shape their community so that
it embodies their conception of the 'decent life 1 ."
The facts here are different, of course, as the material is only to
be or afforded constitutional protection if not obscene, but the
perspective to be used in a balancing of rights is the same;
16

Miller must be applied with sufficient good sense that both the
rights of the individual and the rights of the community

are

blended in a fair and reasonable exercise of government.
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